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Abstract 
This working paper explores the role of the future as a space of scientific exchange and 
dialogue in the Cold War period. We argue that in East and West the governance of the 
future were understood as both intellectual and technical problem that, importantly, 
challenged existing notions of the nature of liberal democratic and communist political 
regimes. Casting the future as a governable sphere led to the development of new forms of 
scientific governance which sought explicitly to depoliticize the future and turn it into a new 
transnational domain of technocratic politics. The paper focuses on the parallels and 
exchanges among American and Soviet futurologists. East-West collaboration was essential 
to the invention of the future as a governable technoscientific space, situated beyond political 
dispute.   
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Introduction 
Problems to do with prediction, futurity and anticipation are rapidly coming to the 
forefront of social science in a range of different disciplines, for instance in political sociology 
and social studies of science and technology (STS) and anthropology (Brown and Michael 
2003, Adam 2005, Mallard and Lakoff 2010). To this we can add a number of key works in 
the history of science (Rosental 2003, Dahan Dalmedico 2007, Hartmann and Vogel 
2010).This emerging interest in the history of prediction has been underpinned by a growing 
focus on the circulation of ideas (Kott 2008, Connelly 2009) and on the transnational as a 
particular site of production of knowledge and policy (Guilhot 2008). 
However, the emergence of forecasting, futurology, or futures studies, activities that 
shared their interest in predicting or scientifically enacting long term changes, on both sides 
of the Iron Curtain in the 1960s and 1970s, are hitherto little studied. Holding that these 
developments have ever so much to say about the interplay between new manifestations of 
scientific production and constellations of political power in this period (see Andersson 2012), 
this paper pinpoints predictive knowledge and technologies and their role in shaping a 
particular scientific approach to policy making in the period from the 1960s on. A particular 
focus is on the role of prediction as a new form of transnational science in this period and the 
idea of the future as a particular space of neutral or apolitical governance.   
We focus on forecasting, a particular type of predictive knowledge, a transnational 
field that developed in and through a range of contacts between scientists, experts and policy 
makers in the transnational arena. In addition, not only did such expert activity take place 
beyond the boundaries of the nation state, but forecasting also emerged as a particular form 
of expertise that was specifically about world order and the global. We explore the ways in 
which forecasting was developed to intervene into world order, particularly East West 
relations, and the way that it aimed to structure a common field of intervention for scientists 
and policy makers on both sides of the Iron Curtain. As shown in recent Cold War studies, 
East-West collaboration was indeed constitutive for the creation of specific scientific expert 
knowledge practices (Sarasmo and Miklossy 2011). Framed as rational (although both sides 
understood rationality in clearly ideological and political terms) and as a neutral space of 
possible interaction, forecasting was in fact an instrument that facilitated emerging structures 
of global governance, as we show in the case of the IIASA.   
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From the late 1960s and early 1970s forecasting systematically articulated an idea of 
common futures, of future challenges that would impact countries, populations and natural 
environments around the globe. The idea of common long-term problems for all Mankind was 
used as a device to establish connections between the opposing political regimes in East 
and West. Such projections of world futures as global, i.e. originating in common challenges 
that could not be coped with on the national level of governance, were to a large extent 
dependent on key breakthroughs in science and technology as well as the organisation of 
technoscientific production from the 1960s on. Here the key breakthroughs were the rise of 
computer modelling that allowed for simulation of the future states and interdependences of 
increasingly complex system, as well as the emerging global networks of scientists. It is 
therefore very interesting to explore the way in which forecasts postulated that some future 
issues were global and suggested that these issues had to be governed on a transnational 
level. Since the global was ridden by ideological and military confrontation between 
capitalism and communism, the new “policy sciences” (see OECD 1964) were invented as a 
possible politically neutral ground for managing global futures. Within this realm, potentially 
divisive issues not only within but also between countries could be addressed. Cold War 
technoscience developed not only as a kind of diplomatic language of expertise, used by 
both the governments and private foundations, as suggested by a previous historic 
orientation around diplomatic and cultural history (Ninkovich 1981, Dittman 2001, Yale 2003, 
Riska Campbell 2011), but as a quintessentially political form of depoliticizing of control and 
constructions of world order by placing them in the field of science (see a similar argument 
made by Clemens 1990). 
In line with recent studies of scientific transfers in East West relations, we suggest 
that Cold War struggle for super power supremacy assumed particular forms that involved 
defining global issues and tackling them through collaboration in spheres that were 
constructed as non-ideological (Rindzeviciute 2010). Forecasting, being a form of technical 
expertise for resolving highly strategic issues of control, planning, security and military 
interests on both sides, was particularly indicative of this. Forecasting relied on cybernetics 
and systems analysis: theoretical frameworks that incorporated prediction as an essential 
component of governance and control and emerged in the 1940s.In the field of forecasting, 
there was mutual interest from American and Soviet scientists to follow the methodological 
advances of the other, and governments shared this interest in an area understood at the 
time as strategic not least because of the nuclear threat. Such interactions, ranging from 
espionage and monitoring to translation of texts and even direct collaborations, were in place 
in the period from the mid-1960s on, and they set the scene for collaboration at a later stage 
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of Cold War relations when more direct forms of interaction at co-organised conferences, 
publications and even institutions were developed.  
We suggest that this shift in the content and use of prediction, from a tool of war 
(radar tracking, arms race), competition (market research) and rivalry (technological 
innovation), to ideas of common challenges was made possible through re-invention of 
technoscientific governance. The history of this new type of governance was tightly 
connected to the development of systems analysis. The idea of East-West institute, which 
was to become the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA, established by 
the US and Soviet governments in Laxenburg, Austria in 1972), was initiated by John F. 
Kennedy’s and Lyndon B. Johnson’s governments in the mid-1960s. A sustained East-West 
collaboration at IIASA was envisioned as a platform to forge a new mode of interaction 
between authoritarian and liberal democratic regimes. While part of our paper focuses on the 
role of IIASA, our intention is to write neither an institutional nor diplomatic history of 
prediction. Instead we will lay out the simultaneous construction of new scientific knowledge 
(forecasting and systems analysis), a new political world order (where non-state actors take 
an increasingly important role) and a new type of governance (which relies on scientific 
expertise that transcends national boundaries). In our view, this pushes the analysis of 
prediction from the genealogies of scientific production as such, to an analysis of the way 
that both the construction and use of prediction is a matter of power and political play, 
particularly in the East West relations that we study. 
This paper consists of three sections: first, we discuss the emergence of a global field 
of prediction, and the actors and networks that structure it in the long period of the Cold War 
on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Second, we lay out the idea of common future challenges 
which emerged in the period from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, and third, we focus on 
the creation of the IIASA as an embodiment of these ideas of a neutral space of scientific 
governance.  
 
The emergence of a global field of prediction: from war games to the post-industrial 
society 
The interest in various forms of prediction – forecasting, scenario methods, 
technology assessment, systems theory, cybernetics, futurology or futures studies – boomed 
in the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s with a surge in reports emanating from 
scientists associated with a number of institutions such as the American RAND corporation, 
the OECD, and eventually, the IIASA. From the mid-1960s, following the publication of a 
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number of reports aimed at a high level of policy planning, such as the 1964 Delphi study at 
RAND (Helmer and Gordon 1964). Eric Jantsch’ OECD paper on technological forecasting 
(Jantsch and OECD 1967), or the OECD report on science policy in 1964, forecasting 
emerged as what might really be described as a new gospel. Pervasive spread of forecasting 
in many diverse disciplines and sectors could be compared with scientific management and 
rationalization discourse that came to dominate the interplay between social science and 
policy in the interwar period.  
The promise of this new gospel was to provide new analytical tools for understanding 
“complex societies” or societies that were perceived, in the mid- to late 1960s, as moving 
rapidly and confusingly from stable forms of industrial capitalism to much more chaotic and 
unforeseeable post-industrial structures, where the role of politics as the central organising 
mechanism was reduced. Post-industrial societies, wrote the sociologist and forecaster 
Daniel Bell in his 1973 book, A Venture in Social Forecasting, which by then recapitulated 
thoughts that Bell had first advanced in the networks of forecasters in the mid-1960s , were 
societies of complexity, that could not be coordinated by existing forms of planning, but 
required an extension of the horizon both in time and complexity. Post-industrial societies, 
societies in which information flowed freely, required forecasting, in Bell’s interpretation a 
form of decision theory which could lay out the multitude of potential futures facing decision-
makers (Bell 1973). 
It can be suggested that the breeding ground for the forecasting was the idea of 
complexity and uncertainty, the dismissal of linear or evolutionary accounts of growth or 
progress, and the idea of social development as potentially chaotic. Linear forms of planning 
were not sufficient in complex systems; hence new forms of anticipation, encompassing ever 
more factors and ever longer stretches of time, had to be developed. It is important to note 
that such complexity was perceived as being beyond traditional class-based political ideology 
– which had in any case by now been dismissed as dead. Forecasting was, like its 
intellectual sibling systems analysis , often perceived as a quintessentially technocratic 
activity: at the early stage, forecasts were geared to the producing of closed futures, i.e. 
reducing complexity and outlining singular paths of development (see Armatte 2007). For 
instance, as Schmidt Gernig has suggested, a key purpose of forecasting was the creation of 
new forms of expertise of “policy science”, in other words, ways of scientificising policy 
making (Schmidt Gernig 2003). This effort was well reflected in the design of the Delphi 
study, produced by Olaf Helmer and Theodore Gordon at Rand in 1964, which was 
presented as a crucial step in a new scientific approach to policy issues, and this idea of 
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delineating, in a scientific, systematic and rational way, the options available for decision 
making, was a central impetus of the new science (Helmer and Gordon 1964).  
By its own advocates, forecasting was indeed understood as a new science, which 
offered the promise of accurate prediction. RAND forecaster Olaf Helmer optimistically 
argued in a range of papers and articles that forecasting made prediction possible, since 
science could now, with the help of new analytical tools of computers, amass the totality of 
available information about ongoing developments. Debates on forecasting were conducted 
in technocratic terms, meaning that they approached social and political problems as issues 
of management. In this vein, production of the knowledge about the future was understood 
as a “social technology” aimed at perfecting human society by forging individual and social 
choices to better future use. “Selecting among the array of possible futures” was a matter of 
“great social responsibility” for a new generation of scientists, most of them mathematicians 
or astrophysicists (Helmer 1964).  
The rise of forecasting in the 1960s was linked to several key developments in 
science going back into the first decade after the war. Already in the 1950s scientists wrote 
about on-going “cybernation” or a spread of cybernetic sciences as a new universal and 
transdisciplinary approach (George 1959, Dechert 1966). The influence of cybernetics to 
great many disciplines has been outlined by, for instance, Celine Lafontaine (2004) who 
analysed cybernetisation of linguistic structuralism and post-structuralism. In turn, Jon Agar 
(2003), Slava Gerovitch (2002), Paul N. Edwards (1996) and Philip Mirowski (2002) 
suggested that origins of “cyborg science”, in other words the computer-driven (both 
technologically and metaphorically) shift in mathematics and economics towards game 
theory and rational choice theory can be found in the experiments in prediction that stemmed 
from attempts during the Second World War with cybernetic modelling of airstrikes. 
Forecasting was directly related to both the methods and broader mentality of governance as 
shaped by the cybernetic approach. The father of cybernetics, the American mathematician 
Norbert Wiener, was rather strongly against using statistical time series to predict other than 
strictly technical phenomena, e.g. economic or social developments. He held this kind of 
prediction as being technically flawed, because one could never have the complete data 
about the initial state of the system in question, be it a population or society (Wiener 1965: 
25). However, many other scientists were much more optimistic about the breadth of the 
uses of prediction.  
In addition to cybernetic theory of control via information loops, rationalist approaches 
such as the development of game theory and simulation following the book by John von 
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Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern set an influential paradigm in thinking about rationality of 
political behaviour (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Amadae 2003). Drawing on rules 
of formal logic, game theory claimed to predict at least several possible moves of the 
opponent. The possibility of prediction offered by “gaming” was based on the presumption of 
the rational behaviour of actors, but also on the condition that the actors shared the 
knowledge about the rules. Game theory was used in a wide variety of approaches to 
prediction from the 1960s on, maybe most importantly in nuclear strategy and military war 
games as they were developed particularly at the American RAND Corporation from the 
early 1960s, but also in the USSR (Kaplan 1991, Connelly et al 2012, Moiseev 1993/2002).  
It became a central impetus on international relations, where the new scientific methods of 
prediction were instrumental to the creation of a new field organized around the study of a 
multitude of different actors whose moves were made predictable based on the presumption 
of rational material interests of nations (Guilhot 2008). 
Despite its self-representation, forecasting was not a neutral activity: it was 
permeated with political ambitions to increased control. It could be argued that forecasting 
developed, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, with an eye to both domestic and international 
struggles over direction and future. In the West, forecasting spread from its origins in military 
planning, nuclear strategy and war games to cover a range of different activities, including 
industrial developments and technological forecasting or so called technology assessment, 
particularly around military technologies and information systems. Forms of social forecasting 
became prominent particularly from the mid-1960s, drawing on Lazarsfeld’s and Parsons’ 
work in applied sociology, tracking patterns of social behaviour, preference formation, 
electoral shifts (Bell 1973). In the Soviet Union, forecasting of social development was 
included in the agenda of the Institute for Concrete Social Research at the Soviet Academy 
of Sciences (est. 1968), theoretical and methodological issues of social forecasting were 
discussed in the numerous seminars organised by the Soviet Association for Scientific 
Prognosis (1969-1971) (see also Firsov 2012). In political science, behaviourism and 
decision theory was at the heart of a range of new approaches. Forecasting was thus not just 
a particular activity of science, but also allowed for key shifts within the (social) sciences at 
large – moving them closer to policy and claiming an influence on decision making. In fact 
the claim to prediction was at the heart of the post war generation of social science, turned to 
application, use, and decision – and arguably, it was central in new configurations between 
science and policy East and West.  
As we will show, the question of collaboration and bridge-building is crucial, but in the 
first half of the 1960s, forecasting was dominated by security concerns of the blocs and the 
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question of rivalry and domination of world order. On the American side, forecasters ranging 
from the nuclear strategists at RAND to the more dovish sociologists, lawyers or economists 
– Daniel Bell, Edward Shils, Stephen Graubard, Eugene Rostow – were part of a security 
political nexus linking the  State Department, the Council for Foreign Relations, the Congress 
for Cultural Freedom (and through the latter the CIA) and the Ford Foundation. This network 
of actors joined by anticommunism and scientific positivism played a key role in structuring 
an international field of prediction. From 1960, the Ford Foundation, under the leadership of 
first Shepard Stone (previous high commissioner for occupied Germany), then McGeorge 
Bundy (previous national security advisor to Johnson on East West relations, NATO and 
nuclear strategy), targeted the area of forecasting as one of particular importance for the 
social sciences. The Ford Foundation had been instrumental in exporting management 
studies as part of the new post war social sciences to Western and Eastern Europe since the 
early 1960s, meanwhile Bundy was, according to Gemelli, a strategic mediator in the 
establishment of IIASA (Gemelli 1998, 2001:197). Forecasting was the next step in this 
programme, in which management techniques were now to be applied to politics in the 
domestic as well as the international field.  
From the point of view of these American actors, forecasting was a form of 
modernization theory (Gilman 2003). The “modernization theorists”(Shils, Yale Law School 
Dean Gene Rostow and his brother Walt, Kenneth Arrow, Karl Deutsch, John Neumann, 
Oscar Morgenstern) were keenly interested in forecasting, which seemed to offer possibilities 
for prediction of nuclear strategy and events in international relations, but also in preference 
shaping and value systems of Western masses, potentially disturbing aspects such as non-
conformist social behaviour (for instance, the so-called Commission for the Year 2000 
chaired by Bell was highly concerned with the emerging protests against the Vietnam war 
and  the problem of the hippie generation).  Forecasters were thus part of a network which 
was organized around the belief in the foreseeability of tensions between the two different 
world systems as well as within the world system as a whole (Andersson 2012 and 
Andersson ongoing).  
The development of forecasting in the West was thus strongly influenced by the 
shifting foreign policies and the American interest in the re-creation of Europe in general. 
Numerous power struggles, both political and institutional ones, marked the creation of this 
new domain of knowledge, and it would appear that the perceived need to control potentially 
volatile and unforeseeable developments domestically and in the international arena went 
hand in hand, despite the way that previous research has usually targeted the idea of nuclear 
control. In this context the development of forecasting as a device of technoscientific 
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governance in the Soviet Union stands out as a similar process of rethinking and 
reorganising state governance, and as a response to similar issues in the internal as well as 
the international environment. However, Soviet forecasting was ridden by its own unique 
issues that will be accounted for in the next section. 
 
Forecasting in the Soviet Union 
Forecasting, known in the Soviet Union as both predvidenie and prognozirovanie 
(foresight and prognosis, in Russian), dated back to the debates on five-year plans in the 
1920s. In the discussion about the first Soviet state five-year plan, Vladimir Rudnev-Bazarov 
proposed that scientific technical innovation was a continuous process and therefore insisted 
that the Soviet plan should not define the means and goals to a minute detail. Instead the 
plan should be written as a “plan-prognosis”, by which he meant an open process of planning 
that produced both directives and prognoses, as well as “set the goals and genetically 
ground the implementation in the scientific basis” (Klebaner 2004:153).  
However, under Stalin’s rule in 1928-1953, the political context turned to be extremely 
hostile to this notion of planning. Politically set goals were to be implemented regardless of 
existing constraints, financial and human costs. In turn, experts’ governance was reduced to 
finding the ways for the implementation of a plan that was set by the top politicians (Kotkin 
2007, Josephson 1996). Furthermore, Stalinist governance relied on raw force, arbitrary 
terror and personal alliances. It was loyalty and not scientific knowledge, or even engineering 
skills that mattered. Many scientists were prosecuted not exactly because their ideas 
conflicted with Marxism-Leninism, but because they were unfortunate to be treated by other 
scientists or party members as personal enemies (Krementsov 1996, Klebaner 2004: 153-
155).  
After the Second World War, due to both the intensifying Cold War, anti-Western 
policies and internal political struggles in the Soviet academia many approaches, including 
Wiener’s cybernetics, were officially banned in the Soviet Union as erroneous bourgeois 
science. The ban was eventually lifted after the famous Khrushchev’s speech that rejected 
Stalinism in 1956. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the Soviet government was increasingly 
concerned about being left behind the economic development of the Western countries. 
Some of the pre-Stalin theorists who contributed to the prognosis field were rehabilitated, for 
example, Konstantin Tsiolkovskii, but not Rudnev-Bazarov. In turn, many Soviet scholars 
actively engaged in the growing field of cybernetic research that was quickly extended (at 
least, in theory) to economic, social and humanities fields (Gerovitch 2002, Rindzeviciute 
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2008). In the context of the experience of Stalin’s arbitrary terror, a worldview that proposed 
orderly systems, self-regulated by cybernetic control, appealed to some Soviet scholars and 
policy makers as a kind of freedom. In their popular book The Contours of the Future (1965) 
the historian Igor Bestuzhev-Lada and science-fiction writer Oleg Pisarzhevskii suggested a 
term “prognostics” (prognostika in Russian) to designate a new disciplinary field of knowing 
and governing the future (Grazhdannikov 1988:10-11). According to Bestuzhev-Lada 
(1970:6) prognostics was a science about laws and methods used in prognosing. Technical 
instruments of prognosis included surveys, expert evaluations, statistical extrapolations, 
probability theory, game theory, as well as prognostical computer modelling. Prognostical 
modelling was based on a stochastic and probabilist approach to the future development 
(Lada 1970:7). Although forecasting remained clearly subordinated to communist planning 
that sought to define closed and deterministic futures, scientific rationality contained a 
promise of more predictable peace and less arbitrary terror. 
As the Soviet government sought to rejuvenate its technoscientific base and resume 
contacts with the Western scientists and industrialists, it came to face a new challenge. The 
era of centrally enforced industrialisation was confronted with the ideas about post-industrial 
economy and society that gained momentum in the West. Visions of a new economy, based 
on fully automated factories, questioned and sought to undermine the established political 
discourses in both East and West. Increasing automatisation and changing nature of control 
constituted political vulnerability “from inside”, that was further reinforced by a new kind of 
vulnerability “from outside” as the fast advancing satellite and rocket technology made both 
Soviet and Western territories open to surveillance and invasion. 
In this context technology of forecasting went hand in hand with tightening of control and 
reshaping of the very nature of control. In spring 1966 the 23rd CPSU Congress announced 
the development of forecasting (prevideniie, prognozirovanie) in order to make planning 
more scientific (Bestuzhev-Lada 1970). This coincided with Kosygin-Brezhnev’s era that 
involved intensifying centralisation of administrative control. Bazarov-Rudnev’s view of 
prognosis-based planning was still regarded as highly controversial; hence measures were 
taken to make sure that prognosis was not understood as an alternative to the plan. 
Politically centralised planning was understood as the very core and identity of Soviet 
system. Similarly, explicit and numerous statements were issued that cybernetic control did 
not replace, but operationalised Party-based decision-making and governance.  
These multiple precautions suggest that forecasting, just like cybernetic control, were 
regarded as having a strong potential to transform Soviet regime beyond recognition. In this 
way the 1960s were not only the period of the intense Cold War and arms race, but also a 
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time of transformation of the entire worldview. System-cybernetic technoscience bore both 
promise and threat of political implications for both Soviets and Western governments.  
In the early 1970s, a massive regrouping in the Soviet landscape of forecasting took 
place. The historian Gordon L. Rocca suggests that the governmental uses of scientific 
prognosis may have been compromised by the Prague Spring, in which distinguished Czech 
forecasters took an important role (Rocca 1981:232). While this might be quite true, the role 
of inside institutional politics in the reorganization of forecasting research should not be 
underestimated. For example, as a consequence of the internal complaints about 
excessively liberal atmosphere and non-communist views, the Institute of the Concrete 
Social Research at the Academy of Sciences in Moscow was reorganized: the institute lost 
about three fourths of its staff and the director and although it continued doing social 
forecasting, the atmosphere was not conducive to academic freedom and innovation. The 
Soviet Association for Scientific Prognosis and the Public Institute for Social Prognosis, the 
organisations that sprang from below and united hundreds of scientists across various 
disciplines, were closed down (see Firsov 2012, also Mespoulet 2007). From the Institute of 
the Concrete Social Research, some prognosticians were transferred to the State Committee 
of Science and Technology (GKNT), directed by Dzhermen Gvishiani, who, together with 
Bundy and Howard Raiffa was the key actor behind the establishment of IIASA. Other 
prognosticians, especially those who worked with mathematical models of prognosis, were 
transferred to the State Planning Committee (Gosplan). These changes were bitterly 
criticised by Igor Bestuzhev-Lada, both a committed member of the communist party and 
internationally famous promoter of the future studies in the Soviet Union. In his memoir, 
Bestuzhev was highly critical of Gvishiani’s Committee, writing that it “was not able to engage 
in any meaningful research”, whereas Gosplan hardly needed any social forecasting at all 
(Bestuzhev-Lada2004).  
Here Bestuzhev hints at an important discrepancy between belief in the scientific 
rationality and imperatives of practice that was inherent to Soviet governance. Forecasting 
demanded formal rationalisation of economic relations and management, as well as vast 
statistical data in order to produce extrapolations. In contrast, the really existing Soviet 
planning process was highly informal, based on clientelism and bargaining. A combination of 
formal rationalisation with informality that prevailed in Soviet governance was explosive: it 
threatened revealing widespread corruption and ineffectiveness in Soviet economy. 
Furthermore, a probabilistic forecasting implied a mentality of governance that was alien to 
the CPSU vision: in his memoir Gvishiani admitted that the idea that Soviet politics and 
society may face non-deterministic futures was not at all popular with high CPSU officials 
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(Gvishiani 2004:103). The next section shows that it was in the sphere of concerns about the 
issues that featured across the globe where Soviet forecasters gained some autonomy. 
 
Common challenges and future as global space of governance  
The idea of establishing and deepening collaboration with Soviet scientists was, as 
we will see, a crucial factor behind the American interest in IIASA. However, IIASA was not 
the only platform for East and West to meet: in the late 1960s, there were a number of such 
attempts to create an international milieu of forecasting in order to establish it as a form of 
scientific expertise capable of responding to world challenges. Forecasters themselves 
produced a number of such initiatives. Scientists connected to RAND proposed an 
international lookout institution. Other European futurists embarked on a wave of creation of 
institutes and think-tank organisations, focused on the idea of future problems and future 
challenges. However, from 1966 on, it appeared that the American long-term interest in 
developing European institutions for forecasting became less prominent. IIASA, we suggest, 
emerged as the central site for East-West collaboration, where global future challenges were 
conceptualized as “common problems of advanced societies” (Levien and Winter 1967:9).  
The origins of the idea of common problems can be traced to both the Operations Research 
(OR), which specialised in solving technical “problems”, and development theory, which 
postulated common trajectories of modernisation, mentality of governance.  
 Now, systems analysis and computer modelling that were developed at IIASA brought 
in significant modifications to this OR/development approach. First, as Raiffa (1973:13) had 
put it, IIASA was interested “not primarily to solve the particular problem but rather to use the 
problem to help sharpen techniques, concepts and approaches to problem-solving that could 
be transferred to a myriad of other problem situations”. Then, the method of systems analysis 
required to study certain phenomena, such as population or change in energy resources, 
beyond the national borders. Developing computer technology allowed faster processing of 
ever larger sets of the data. The two trends converged in the first World models that were 
commissioned by the Club of Rome and developed by the MIT mathematician Jay Forrester. 
The famous Forrester and his assistant Meadows models constructed the world as interplay 
of several interdependent systems, where changes in one area could have radical 
consequences in another (Meadows et al 1972, Vieille Blanchard 2007, 2011). Such models 
rapidly developed in complexity in the period from the late 1960s to the late 1970s. While 
forecasting in the early period of the 1960s was mainly concerned with questions of stability 
and optimal balance, for example, the economic growth, by the late 1960s the objects of 
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global predictions were increasingly about instability and potential crisis of the world system. 
The famous report The Limits to Growth (Meadow et al 1972), commissioned and publicised 
by the Club of Rome, was probably the most illustrative example of a prediction of global 
change and the way that it was directly linked to questions of unsustainability and disaster 
(Moll 1991, Vieille Blanchard 2011). Although Forrester’s model featured some method flaws, 
the main importance of the report was that it stirred heated public and scientific debates and 
contributed to a larger public visibility of technoscience and interconnectedness. The analysis 
of the modelled results in the report showed the problems of imbalance and disorder were 
embedded in the existing technical, social and natural systems. Hence, solutions for these 
problems were also to be sought with help of methods of system analysis.  
 The Club of Rome was an interesting phenomenon of its time. Its creation in 1968 
followed on a series of initiatives within the OECD with using the policy sciences in planning, 
for instance (sic) the interfuturs programme. The Bellagio declaration (1968) spoke of a 
serious social crisis, brought on by the interaction of manifold social, economic, 
technological, political and psychological forces that could no longer be handled internally by 
separate scientific disciplines and national institutions. Instead, these issues required 
international planning capable of handling systemic complexity: “It is in relation to this crisis 
that we feel the planning function and related arts such as forecasting to assume new 
significance…” (Bellagio Declaration, November 2 1968, in Futures 1:3 March 1969). 
Forecasting was thus understood as a new scientific method capable of defusing social 
conflict, rationally analysing value conflicts, and recreating systemic balance in a system 
prone to disorder.  
 The idea of common problems also stemmed from the so-called convergence debate 
which was part of the argument about post-industrial societies on both sides. Observations of 
the Soviet economy and comparisons of statistical data was an important source of 
prediction already from the 1950s (falling back on forms of national accounting from the 
interwar period) (see Engerman 2009). The Marshall plan and the reconstruction of Europe 
after the war led to the production of comparative statistical data around questions of political 
economy and industry. Since the Soviet economy had been perceived by some as the 
miracle of large-scale industrialisation in the interwar period, a lot of post war attention was 
focused on how it would behave in the decades after the Second World War. By the 1960s 
such statistics allowed for the conclusion, among such forecasters as Daniel Bell, that, in 
terms of technoscientific, industrial and even social development, the Soviet system did not 
seem so very different from the capitalist one. Technoscientific revolution appeared to have 
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created a form of transnational class society that faced similar problems of value change, 
automation, urbanization and pollution both in the East and the West.  
 It is important to note that some daring Eastern European intellectuals, especially 
those from Czechoslovachia and Poland, announced the coming of convergence and post-
industrial society in order to criticise self-isolationism and social conservatism of state 
socialist regimes (Richta et al 1968/1973). Convergence and post-industrialism were much 
more carefully approached by Soviet intellectuals: the official Marxist-Leninist view 
demanded for a straightforward rejection of the idea of any convergence between capitalist 
and communist regimes. Indeed, the idea of convergence was interpreted by some 
ideologues as yet another proof of the crisis and decline of the capitalist system (e.g. 
Dziubenko 1974).  
 However, belonging to the post-industrial world meant belonging to the First World. 
Soviet policy makers could not help wishing to be included in the club of “the problems of 
advanced industrial societies”. As “post-industrialism” was charged with deep political 
implications, it was, therefore, replaced with “advanced industrialism”.  In turn, “common 
problems” were chosen very carefully so that they would not explicitly question the legitimacy 
of the communist regime. The problems of advanced industrial societies were, first and 
foremost, future energy demand and supply as well as water resources management. At a 
later stage more subversive problems were added to the list, such as the population studies 
and climate change. This is exactly the case of co-production of technoscience and political 
governance that was explicated in the work of IIASA. 
 
Forging a New Governance for a New World: IIASA 
In 1966 the US president Lyndon B. Johnson announced a vision of a scientific 
institute dedicated to “the shared problems of industrial nations” and working as a bridge 
between East and West (McDonald 1998; see Riska Campbell 2011). There was a 
diplomatic rationale to this project, but it was neither the only, nor a dominant one. For 
example, one of participants of a brainstorming about the new institute in Washington, 
January 1967, a RAND scientists Roger Levien said that “the principal purpose of this 
planned centre is involving the Soviet side into a continuous non-political dialogue about 
methods of analysis of general socio-economic problems” (Gvishiani 2004:93). A later 
document (April 1967) stated: “After the end of World War II in the advanced countries there 
emerged interrelated approaches for solving problems which emerge in society, which are 
characterised by the use of formal mathematical and computer methods. In the Soviet Union 
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and in the countries of Eastern Europe the use of mathematical analysis and computer 
technologies developed within a framework of ‘cybernetics’.  These methods and means of 
systems analysis of societal problems are active and promising stimulus for international 
cooperation (...)” (Ibid: 97).  
In 1967 R.E. Levien and S.G. Winter, Jr. of RAND Corporation developed a proposal 
for “an International Research Center and International Studies Program for Systematic 
Analysis of the Common Problems of Advanced Societies.” Levien and Winter envisioned 
staff of 150-250 and 50-150 visiting researchers at a cost of 3 to 5 million USD per 
year(Levien and Winter 1967: 7, 15). It was planned to situate this reasonably large 
institution in a politically neutral country, Austria, Switzerland and Sweden were named as 
candidates (Ibid, 8). The funding could be channelled through the US National Science 
Foundation and the Soviet Academy of Sciences (Ibid, 16-17). Indeed, the subject areas 
outlined by Levien and Winter were later on used for IIASA, an institution that never grew 
bigger than 100 scholars. 
The formation of IIASA was simultaneous invention of a new discipline (systems 
analysis) and a new world that was defined by it. The sciences that were called in to service 
came from rather specific fields all of which belonged to the so-called rationalist and 
modernisation theory school. A distinguished decision-scientist and game theorist Howard 
Raiffa of Harvard University was invited by Bundy to participate in the negotiations with the 
Soviets, as well as a selection of “defence intellectuals” (Kaplan 1991), such as Carl Kaysen. 
On the Soviet side, the key negotiator was Dzhermen Gvishiani, who held a long interest in 
the Western methods of management and acted as the head of several Soviet foreign 
missions and the vice-director of the Soviet State Science and Technology Committee 
(GKNT). 
Furthermore, as IIASA was intended to be multilateral, it would also serve as a 
vehicle for both West-East and East-East scientific knowledge transfer. For the Soviet side, 
the envisioned IIASA was an important way to access to mainstream Western literature: back 
in the 1960s-70s this was an important problem. As argued by Austin Jersild, the Soviet 
Union in many ways strongly depended on the technoscientific achievements of the Eastern 
European state socialist countries (Jersild 2011). The Eastern European scholars, in turn, 
were not mere puppets of the communist regime, but also actively sought contacts with the 
Western colleagues, as much as the conditions permitted (Sarasmo and Miklossy 2011). 
Scholarly work from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary were important contributions to 
the academic field of forecasting. However, the policy implications remain to be explored: for 
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example, when interviewed one of the authors of Poland 2000 report recalled that the 
practical implications of this study were limited.  
 For the US the idea to create IIASA was driven by a dual intention. First, it can be 
suggested that by working with the top communist scientists the Americans hoped to train 
their opponent (or co-player in the Cold War strategy) to become a more rational actor and a 
better nuclear strategy partner. From this point of view IIASA was a workshop were the future 
predictability of both sides was forged. Second, IIASA was seen as a platform for sharing the 
data for the purposes of computer-based modelling. It is difficult to overemphasise the 
importance of international data issue in the 1960s-70s. True, as Edwards noted, the 
international institutions that facilitated meteorological data exchange among the countries 
from Eastern and Western blocs emerged as early as in 1963. However, such venues of 
“infrastructural globalism” were quite rare in the 1960s (Edwards 1996). Furthermore, the 
envisioned East-West institute would not just facilitate access, but also produce new relevant 
data. Co-production was a crucial component in generating trust in the data: Western 
scholars did not always trust the data supplied by Soviet scholars: a close collaboration, it 
was hoped, would ensure a better production of the data and help to generate more 
trustworthy accounts.  
 In this way, IIASA emerged as an important consequence of these great power 
games was redefinition of the world and reshaping of the political role of technoscience. 
IIASA was dedicated to the institutionalisation and professionalization of systems analysis. 
The main political use of this approach was not just practical utility: systems theory, coupled 
with cost-benefit approach that was popularised by Hitch and MacNamara commanded big 
respect and proved able to claim being political neutral and universal method of governance. 
Systems analysis, it seemed, could be used to depoliticise East-West cooperation on a 
global agenda. For example, RAND experts Levien and Winter wrote that there was a good 
grounds for a new transnationalism in the area of fighting “the unwanted side effects of 
urbanisation and industrialisation” (Levien and Winter 1967).Noting that if “policies and 
institutions may not transfer readily across national boundaries, methods of analysis, 
operational techniques, and technology do”, RAND scientists insisted that “no single nation 
has a monopoly of method, experience, or technology; all would benefit from truly 
international, cooperative effort to resolve issues they all face”(Ibid, 2). “Formal techniques” 
that came under a variety of names of operational research, programme budgeting, systems 
analysis, cybernetics, linear programming, they all, wrote Levien and Winter, were “relatively 
independent of social structures and national values”. They were “only tools” and, moreover, 
they were universal tools: there was no such thing as Eastern or Western operations 
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research, but only “operations research”. The goals are formulated by policy makers in their 
own national frameworks. Therefore, concluded Levien and Winter, these universal and a-
political techniques can served as a vehicle for international cooperation (Ibid, 3).  
A few years later, the methodological guidelines outlined that IIASA’s purpose was to 
solve “concrete and practical problems”. It was noted that the systems approach developed 
at IIASA was in principle based on quantitative methods. The problems that were “political” 
(such as race relations) or deeply “national” and hence a subject of national sovereignty, 
were deemed as “too complicated” for the Institute to engage with. IIASA was to study the 
problems that had “a substantial quantitative content” and were “intrinsically international, 
either because it is a world problem or because it is an important common problem”.  
Forecasting was integrated in IIASA’s research agenda early on. A report by Philip 
Handler, the President of the American National Academy of Sciences, about the 
negotiations with the Soviets about the organisation and research agenda of the planned 
institute included “scientific research and development process design, management and 
prediction (using extrapolatory, analytical and logical techniques and expert opinion 
evaluations), including methodology for K and D scientific and practical output evaluation, 
methods for E and D budgeting, organising ‘problem oriented’ interdisciplinary research”. The 
suggestion included a focus on “methodology for long range planning in education”, as well 
as large scale management, information systems and computer technologies, including 
methodology for large economic sector computer simulation.  However, forecasting did not 
constitute a separate field on the IIASA’s research programme. The Limits of Growth was 
criticised by the scholars associated with IIASA. Carl Kaysen (1972), for example, went long 
to emphasise that IIASA did not approve of Forrester’s methodology and that they did not 
support the ambition of global modelling given the existing shortcomings of both techniques 
and data. Furthermore, although Aurelio Peccei was actively involved in the early talks about 
the IIASA, for some time the Institute actively tried to dissociate itself from the Club of Rome, 
because the Club of Rome became identified with Malthusian approach and The Limits of 
Growth. The reasons for this dissociation were not only scientific, but also political: the Soviet 
Union wanted more growth and preferred not to question this subject area. However, 
although to start with the Brits (Solli Zuckerman) and Soviets (Dzhermen Gvishiani) were 
negative about explicit collaboration between IIASA and the Club of Rome, they rather soon 
adopted a more positive attitude. Here Howard Raiffa was a broker who promoted a gradual 
shift to global statistical modelling at IIASA, as well as initiated collaboration with the 
Meadows.  
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In this context it is understandable why in the 1970s IIASA scholars exercised a 
rather cautious approach and did not use global modelling of the future in their own studies. 
It was held that predictive global modelling was still immature and flawed and IIASA could 
not risk its nascent scientific reputation. However, IIASA research leaders understood that 
global modelling could not be overlooked. IIASA, in this way, chose to act as a mediator in 
the construction of this new international field of knowledge production (Levien 1977:12). By 
the initiative of Raiffa, series of Global Modelling Conferences were arranged at IIASA in 
1974-1981 (Raiffa 2005:98). These conferences, one focused on Pestel-Mesarovic model, 
another one on Fundacion-Bariloche model, brought together various groups that created 
“world models” together to critically assess the issues of such modelling. These groups, it 
was suggested, would have otherwise never met and IIASA emerged as the central 
institution for global modelling. In the 1980s, however, there has been a shift away from the 
global level to more localised models.  
In addition to the global modelling workshops, the internal research programmes at 
IIASA featured devising of great many prognoses, scenarios and forecasts. The most 
significant advances were made in theoretical development of systems approach and 
gearing of this approach to decision-making (the programme for Systems and Decisions 
Sciences was oriented to mathematical decision analysis). In the applied areas, the most 
distinguished contributions included the international studies of population, which moved 
from descriptive models of migration, to highly sophisticated studies. In 1976 IIASA 
organized a conference on Real-time forecasting and control of water resources. From 1983 
the Energy Programme at IIASA, headed by Wolf Häfele, explored the future demands and 
supply of the energy up to 2030 with a clear bias to the nuclear energy production. That the 
energy programme research featured strictly quantitative and technical terms, in the 1980s 
was recognised insufficient as it missed social, economic and political aspects. In 1981 a 
new project, the Process of International Negotiations was launched, which marked a big 
shift in what was considered being neutral and hence appropriate research agenda at IIASA. 
In the early 1970s such a topic would have been deemed too sensitive, but, it has been 
argued that a decade of IIASA’s work contributed to building up a political mutual confidence 
between the US and the Soviet Union.  
The uses of IIASA demand further studies. The conducted interviews support 
statements that were earlier made by other researchers (Clemens 1990, 159) that Western 
scientists wanted access to Soviet data, whereas Soviet scientists wanted access to Western 
models and methods. But most importantly, at IIASA, both sides engaged in surprising 
collaboration, that resulted in developing together new models, producing new data and, 
Jenny Andersson & Eglė Rindzevičiūtė –  
The political life of prediction. The future as a space of scientific world governance in the Cold War era 
Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 04/2012 
 
21 
perhaps most importantly, defining the world anew as subject of global modelling. Defined in 
this way, the world could no longer be partitioned: the conditions for its understanding 
demanded sharing and mutual comprehension. 
 
Concluding remarks 
This paper is a preliminary attempt at a political history of the future, and part of the 
Futurepol project at Sciences Po. We have argued that the 1960s and 1970s saw a surge in 
predictive methodologies as part of what is known in the period as “policy sciences”, such as 
cybernetics, systems analysis and forecasting. Their definitions and boundaries, as well as 
their political usage, was blurred and overlapped in significant ways. We propose here that 
the role of these predictive sciences must be understood, in the Cold War context, as effects 
of developments in science, but also as responses to a series of perceived problems in 
contemporary societies of the time, but that were referred to an emerging arena of global 
scientific expertise. Among these problems were problems associated with the idea of the 
postindustrial society and changing economic, social and demographic conditions, but we 
have also stressed the idea of complexity and interdependence in the world system. The 
paper has also brought out the way that East-West relations played a central role in such 
conceptualisations of the need for science as a form of global governance, and how such 
East-West transfers were crucial impetuses behind the shaping of prediction as a specific 
field of intervention. In this process, we propose, arguments of the depoliticised and neutral 
character of science served, in actual fact, to work out quintessentially political problems to 
do with the Cold War struggle but also to an emerging realm of global governance. An 
argument to be made is that attempts to control and govern such relationships on level of 
world order coincided with concerns with how to control developments internally, in the West 
as well as in the East.  
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